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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KIRBY SMITH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MARKCAZARES,

:

Defendant/Appellant,

Case No. 20060384-CA

:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant Mark Cazares agrees that the Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (2001) (the
Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal from final judgment are: Can a registered
co-owner transfer contractual responsibility to pay a secured creditor to a thirdparty without transferring title under Section 41-la-702? Utah Code Ann. §41-la702(1)(1993).
If a registered co-owner does not have to transfer title pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §41-la-702, does the co-owner have to comply with the statutory odometer

reporting requirements as reflected in Section 41-la-902? Utah Code Ann. §41{

la-902(2) (1992).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
J

•

~ ~ " ~ ~ ~

,

^

—

~ • " ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ ~

Generally, the Utah Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over an

<

appeal unless the appeal is made from a final judgment or order. Loffredo v. Hold,
37 P.2d 646 (Utah 2001). Final judgment was made in this case on March 22,
2006. Addendum A. Since the facts are undisputed here, the Court will examine
only issue of law on appeal. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the
i

trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. Harline v. Barker, 92 P.2d 433
(Utah 1996).
DETERMINITIVE PROVISIONS

*

The following statutory provisions are determinative for this appeal.
1.

Utah Motor Vehicle Act, governing Endorsement of Assignment and

<

Warranty of Co-Owners, Utah Code Ann. §41-la-702 (1993).
"(l)(a) To transfer a vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor the owner shall endorse the
certificate of title issued for the vehicle, vessel or outboard motor in the space for
assignment and warranty of title."
"(l)(b) The endorsement and assignment shall include a statement of all liens and
encumbrances on the vehicle, vessel or outboard motor.
i

2

<

2.

Utah Motor Vehicle Act, governing Odometer Statement Disclosure,

Utah Code Ann. §41-la-902 (1992).
"(2) At the time of the sale or transfer of a motor vehicle, the transferror shall
furnish to the transferee a written odometer disclosure statement in a form
prescribed by the [Division of Motor Vehicles]. This statement shall be signed and
certified as to its truthfulness by the transferor, stating:
(a) the date of transfer;
(b) the transferor's name and address;
(c) the transferee's name and address;
(d)the identity of the motor vehicle, including its make, model, year, body
type, and identification number;
(e) the odometer reading at the time of transfer not including tenths of miles
or tenths of kilometers;
(f) (i) that to the best of the transferor's knowledge, the odometer reading
reflects the amount of miles or kilometers the motor vehicle has actually
been driven
(ii) that the odometer reading reflects the amount of miles or kilometers
in excess of the designated mechanical odometer limit; or
(iii) that the odometer reading is not the actual amount of miles or
kilometers; and
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(g) a warning to alert the transferee if a discrepancy exists between the
odometer reading and the actual mileage.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In May of 2002, Appellee Kirby Smith purchased a 2000 Toyota Tundra and

<

a 1998 Lincoln Navigator. R. 133. Just six months later, Mr. Smith placed an
advertisement in Auto Trader Magazine listing his Toyota Tundra for sale. R. 21.
At the time, Mr. Smith was experiencingfinancialdifficulties, was over $1000.00
in arrears on the Tundra payment, and as a result wanted to sell at least one of his
i

four family vehicles to reduce his debt and monthly car note payments. R. 21,26.
On or around December 2002, Kirby Smith was contacted by Mr. Charles
Martinez on behalf of a company called U.S. Auto Management. R. 21. U.S. Auto
Management responded to Mr. Smith's advertisement and obtained Mr. Smith's
permission to facilitate arrangement of a third-party to take over payments owed to

<

Toyota Financial on Mr. Smith's Tundra. R. 21-23. U.S. Auto Management told
Mr. Smith they were a "kind of middle man," that found buyers for private sellers
of vehicles. R. 22. In addition tofindinga buyer for the Tundra, U.S. Auto
Management agreed to manage the contractual relationship between the buyer and
seller by ensuring that payments were made timely made by the 5* day of each
month. R. 22.
<

4

That same month, U.S. Auto Management notified Mr. Smith that they had
found a buyer for the Tundra. R. 23. U.S. Auto Management did not disclose the
identity of the buyer to the Smiths, however, U.S. Auto Management promised the
first monthly payment of $528.82 would be arriving shortly. R. 23,28,168. In the
event that the payment did not arrive or if the buyer faltered on the payments, U.S.
Auto Management told the Smiths that they would provide collection and
repossession services. R. 23. This arrangement continued uninterrupted through
February 2003. At this time, U.S. Auto Management notified the Smiths that the
buyer was in arrears and U.S. Auto Management was attempting to repossess the
Tundra. R. 31.
In March 2003, Mr. John Redmond contacted Ms. Smith. R. 30-31. Mr.
Redmondsaidhe was an employee of Appellant Mr. Mark Cazares. R. 30-31. Mr.
Mark Cazares had purchased Mr. Smith's Tundra through U.S. Auto Management.
R. 30. According to Mrs. Smith, Mr. Redmond told her that Mr, Cazares wished to
arrange a direct agreement with the Smiths to purchase the Tundra, thereby
circumventing the contract through U.S. Auto Management. R. 30.
Mr. and Mrs. Smith arranged to meet Mr. Cazares and Mr. Redmond at
Serenity Salon (the Smith's family business) in Orem, Utah. R. 32. At the
meeting, Mr. Smith and Mr. Cazares agreed to continue the purchase agreement as
originally established by U.S. Auto Management. R. 33. The Smiths opened a
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bank account at Mr. Cazares' bank, Mountain America by which Mr. Cazares was
to deposit roughly $528 per month directly into Mr. Smith's account. R. 33. The
Smiths would thereby make the payment to Toyota Financial. R. 33. The parties
entered into a contract whereby the parties agreed to continue with the financial

<

arrangements made through U.S. Auto Management. R. 33. The contract also
provided that Mr. Cazares would maintain auto insurance, vehicle registration, and
vehicle upkeep. R. 33.
On June 9,2003, the Smiths allegedly made an oral agreement with Mr.
<

Cazares to take over the Smiths' $587.97 monthly payment on a 1998 Lincoln
Navigator. R. 39. Mr. Cazares was to pay $587.97 to WFS financial by the 10th
day of each month until the entire amount of the Smiths' loan was paid. R. 3, 162.
The Smiths gave Mr. Cazares possession of the Navigator, but they did not transfer
possession of the title to the vehicle because WFS financial retained possession of

'

the title. R. 39-40. The Smiths purport that the oral Navigator agreement
obligated Mr. Cazares to procure auto insurance on the Navigator. R. 42.

(

Sometime during the month of June 2003, Mrs. Smith claims she had a
conversation with Mr. Cazares in which Mr. Cazares orally agreed to purchase (not
rent) the Smiths' Hydroswift Boat. R. 42,45. At the time, the Smiths had garaged
the Hydroswift in Salt Lake to have the boat winterized. R. 47. Mr. Cazares went
<

to Hydroswift in Salt Lake to pick up the boat. R. 48. The parties then agreed to
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<

meet at a gas station at Thanksgiving Point located in Alpine, Utah on July 3,
2003. R. 48. The parties met on this date so that Mr. Cazares could learn how to
operate the boat. R. 48.
Mrs. Smith testified that in a telephone conversation with Mr. Cazares
regarding the boat, the parties agreed to "have a written contract the exact same as
on the Tundra and Navigator," which included taking over payments, registering
the boat, maintaining insurance, and performing maintenance on the boat. R. 48.
If Mr. Cazares performed all of these terms fully, he would receive title to the boat
from the lien holder. R. 48. However, just as with the Navigator agreement, Mr.
Cazares never signed a written contract. R. 52.
Ms. Smith purports that Mr. Cazares was to transfer the money for the
monthly payments on these three vehicles to the Smiths' bank account at Mountain
America, by which the Smiths would make the monthly payments to the lien
holders. R. 59-62. At trial, the Smiths stated that Mr. Cazares began making late
payments on the vehicles as of July 2003. R. 69-74. Mr. Smith testified that he
made several calls to Mr. Cazares regarding the late payments during August 2003.
R. 95-99.
On September 13,2003, Mr. Cazares met with the Smiths at Serenity Salon
to return possession of the Navigator and Hydroswift boat. R. 75. At this time, the
Navigator had a past-due balance of $1,264.71 and the boat had a past-due balance
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of $917.72. R. 77-78. The Smiths did not make any additional payments on the
Navigator or the boat. R. 82-83. The Smiths subsequently voluntarily returned the
Navigator to WFS financial on December 30,2003. R. 82. Bank of America, the
lien holder on the Hydroswift boat, obtained possession of the boat and sold it to

i

minimize the balance of the loan. R. 84-87.
On September 30,2003, the Smiths had received notice that the Tundra had
a past-due balance of $1,072.01. R. 79. Upon receiving this notification, Ms.
Smith gave a set of keys to the Tundra to her brother, Mr. Devin Stevenson so that
<

Mr. Stevenson could locate and repossess the TundrafromMr. Cazares. R. 121.
Mr. Stevenson testified that he found the Tundra in the parking lot of Mamma's
Southern Plantation Cafe in Salt Lake City. R. 122. Mr. Stevenson called Mrs.
Smith, who then subsequently called the police to alert the law enforcement
authorities that Mr. Stevenson was going to attempt to obtain possession of the

<

vehiclefromMr. Cazares. R. 123. When Mr. Stevenson saw Mr. Cazares emerge
from the restaurant, he approached Mr. Cazares and asked him to turn over the
Tundra. R. 124. Mr. Stevenson also told Mr. Cazares that the police had been
called and would be arriving shortly. R. 124. Mr. Cazares refused to give Mr.
<

Stevenson the vehicle and instead sat in the vehicle and waited for the police. R.
124-125. Mr. Stevenson subsequently positioned himself in front of the truck in an
effort to prevent Mr. Cazaresfromdriving away. R. 124-125. Because the police
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i

were taking a long time to arrive, Mr. Cazares left in the Tundra. R. 124. Toyota
Financial eventually repossessed the Tundra in February 2004. R. 80.
Mr. Cazares' name was never listed as a co-owner on the titles held by the
various lien holders. At all times, the Smiths remained co-owners of the Tundra,
Navigator, and the Hydroswift boat. Mrs. Smith testified that Mr. Cazares was
never provided with odometer disclosure on the Tundra or on the Navigator. R.
140-141. While Mr. Cazares signed a written agreement to purchase the Tundra,
he never signed a written agreement to purchase either the Navigator or the
Hydroswift boat. R. 146. The Smiths did not perform a credit check on Mr.
Cazares and furthermore, the Smiths allowed Mr. Cazares to take possession of all
oftiievehicles without any kind of a lump sum down payment. R. 195.
Mr. Smith did not have authorization from WFS Financial, Toyota Financial
or Bank of America to sell these vehicles to Mr. Cazares. As a result, Mr. Cazares
was not given formal notice regarding the delinquency of the accounts. R. 190,
202. The Smiths' contractual relationship with WFS financial expressly stated mat
the Smiths would "keep the property in your possession in good condition and
repair." R. 185. The contract further stated that the Smiths would "not attempt to
sell the property unless it is properly identified inventory, or otherwise transfer any
rights in the property to anyone else without our (WFS's) prior written consent."
R. 186.

9

Mr. Cazares was never shown any purchase documents or finance
documents on any of the three vehicles prior to September 13,2003. R. 197.
While Mr. Cazares was not provided with written odometer disclosure regarding
the three vehicles, Mr. Cazares did understand his agreement with the Smiths to be
a continuation of the purchase agreement first formed through U.S. Auto
Management. R. 199-200. In Mr. Cazares' testimony he states that the Smiths
asked him if he was interested in purchasing a boat, to which he replied that he
would be interested in renting the boat during the months of July and August 2003.
R. 201. The Smiths agreed to this arrangement, thereby Mr. Cazares returned the
boat to the Smiths on September 13,2003. Mr. Cazares further testified that Mr.
Smith called and asked Mr. Cazares to return the Navigator not because Mr.
Cazares was delinquent in payments, but because Mr. Smith needed another
vehicle. R. 203. At this time, Mr. Cazares returned the vehicle to Mr. Smith. R.
203.
On March 22, 2006, the Fourth Judicial District Court entered final
judgment in favor of Appellee Kirby Smith against Appellant Mark Cazares for
breach of contract for purchase of the Toyota Tundra, Lincoln Navigator,
Hydroswift, the respective interest for each vehicle, incidental damages, reasonable
interest fees and taxable costs totaling $65,893.93. Addendum A.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1A. Mr. Smith did not hold title to the vehicles at issue. Therefore, Mr.
Smith did not have anything to convey to Mr. Cazares. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la702 provides that an owner of a vehicle must endorse the certificate of title and
provide a statement of all liens and encumbrances on the vehicle. Where Mr.
Smith failed to list Mr. Cazares as the registered co-owner of the vehicles, Mr.
Smith did not convey his interest in the Tundra, Navigator, or Hydroswift boat to
Mr. Cazares. Mr. Smith's failure to list Mr. Cazares on the titles does create a
private right of action where consumer protection is a significant policy behind the
statute.
IB. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-902 further requires a written odometer
disclosure statement to be made at the time the vehicle is conveyed. Ultimately,
Mr. Smith did not provide the odometer disclosure mandated by the Code. Mr.
Smith's failure to provide the odometer disclosure statement creates a private right
of action where consumer protection is a significant policy consideration behind
the statute.
2. The Navigator and Tundra Agreements regarding default or breach are
illusory and unenforceable. Furthermore, the section of Paragraph Three
contemplating the return of both vehicles to Smith under all circumstances in any
event or default or breach by Mr. Cazares does not reflect any accord between the
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parties as to a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that Mr.
Cazares' breach or default would cause. Accordingly, Paragraph Three of the
Agreements is a penalty clause, does not describe liquidated damages, and is
therefore unenforceable. Gelzos v. Frontier Investments. 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah
App. 1995).
ARGUMENT
I.

MR. SMITH DID NOT CONVEY HIS INTEREST IN THE
TUNDRA, NAVIGATOR, OR HYDROSWIFT BOAT BECAUSE
HE NEVER CONVEYED TITLE OR ODOMETER DISCLOSURE
TO MR. CAZARES.
Mr. Smith never conveyed anything to Mr. Cazares where he did not have

the title changed to reflect Mr. Cazares' name nor did he convey odometer
disclosures for the vehicles. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-702 provides that to properly
transfer ownership of a vehicle, the owner must endorse the certificate of title
issues for the vehicle and provide a statement of all liens and encumbrances on the
vehicle. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-902 provides that at the time of the sale or
transfer of a motor vehicle, the transferor shall furnish a written odometer
disclosure statement.
Appellant Mark Cazares has brought this appeal based on these statutes,
arguing that Appellee Kirby Smith did not convey his interest in the Tundra,
Navigator, or Hydroswift boat to Mr. Cazares. The trial court erred in ruling that
Mr. Smith's violations does not create a private right of action where surely the
12

policy behind the statute is to protect consumers as well as the state. Mr. Smith's
failure to convey title and failure to provide odometer disclosure is discussed in
turn.
A. WHERE MR. SMITH FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE TITLE
CONVEYANCE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1A702, MR. SMITH FAILED TO CONVEY HIS INTEREST IN THE
VEHICLES TO MR. CAZARES.
Mr. Cazares was never listed as a registered co-owner with any of the lien
holders. Mr. Smith did not notify the three registered lien holders (Toyota
Financial, WFS Financial, and Bank of America) mat he intended to convey his
interest in the vehicles to Mr. Cazares. Furthermore, Mr. Cazares never entered
into a written agreement by which to purchase either the Lincoln Navigator or the
Hydroswift boat. For these reasons, the decision of the trial court should be
reversed.
The method for conveyance of title of vehicles is delineated by the Utah
Motor Vehicle Act. At the time a vehicle is sold, the owner must endorse the
certificate of title to the buyer. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-702(l)(a) (1993). The
Statute further mandates that the seller's endorsement of title must include a
statement of all liens and encumbrances on the vehicle. Id. at (l)(b).
The trial court found that the parties had entered into an oral contract to
purchase the Navigator and boat identical to the terms of the purchase of the
Toyota Tundra as arranged by U.S. Auto Management. The trial court ruling sets a
13

disturbing precedent that completely disregards the provision of Utah State
Statutory code governing conveyance of title. Section 41-1 a-702( 1 )(b) provides
that to convey title, an owner must "include a statement of all liens and
encumbrances on the vehicle, vessel or outboard motor." The policy supporting
this code provision is simple; the State has a compelling interest in maintaining
accurate motor vehicle ownership records. The State is charged with many
responsibilities where ownership of a motor vehicle is at issue (policing roadways,
issuing motor vehicle tickets, etc), the State must be able to quickly identify the
bona fide owner of any registered vehicle at any time. Section 41-la-702 provides
a procedure by which the State can effectively track ownership of all motor
vehicles registered within the State of Utah.
Furthermore, financial lending institutions have a compelling interest in
maintaining accurate motor vehicle ownership records. Financial lending
institutions must keep track of vehicles to protect their interest as a secured
creditor. Most lending institutions keep physical possession of the title as a way of
perfecting their security interest. However, the interests of the lending institution
are not properly protected if the debtor is allowed to adjoin third-parties to the
repayment agreement absent prior consentfromthe financial institution.
And finally, the Statute governing conveyance of title protects individuals
fromfraudulentconveyances. Where a debtor canfreelyconvey an encumbered
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interest in a motor vehicle to a third-party absent conveyance of the title, the thirdparty's interest is unprotected. If there is no written record of the agreement or
conveyance of title, the debtor could operate under a guise of conveying title to a
third-party once all the payments are made to the lien holder. However, where the
third-party's name is not memorialized on any of the documents, the third-party
would have no course of action against a debtor seeking to perpetrate fraud. The
reality of these types offraudulenttransfers conveys a private right of action in Mr.
Cazares.
Ultimately, the State of Utah, financial lending institutions and consumers
such as Mr. Cazares each have an overwhelming interest in preserving the integrity
of the Statute governing conveyance of motor vehicle title. In this case, Mr. Smith
did not convey anything to Mr. Cazares except present use of the vehicles - the
rental rate. Mr. Smith did not effectively convey his interest in any of the vehicles
to Mr. Cazares because Mr. Smith did not have title and did not have anything to
convey, other than his present right to use the vehicles.
There was no privity of contract between Mr. Cazares and either WFS
Financial, Bank of America or Toyota Financial. Those entities did not approve or
ratify Mr. Smith's contemplated transfer of either the i) titles that he did not have
to the navigator or the Tundra or; ii) Smith's underlying agreements with WFS
Financial, Bank of America or Toyota Financial, respectively. Accordingly, Mr.
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Cazares is not a party to or guarantor or Mr. Smith's agreements financing the
Navigator or Tundra. Mr. Smith's obligations to WFS Financial, Bank of America
and Toyota Financial are completely independent of his dealings with Mr. Cazares.
Because Mr. Smith failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. §41-la-702 when
Mr. Smith purported to transfer the Navigator and Tundra to Mr. Cazares, and
because Mr. Smith never had title to those vehicles, the June 9,2003 Agreements
are void for failure of consideration. Mr. Smith never properly transferred title or
an interest in the Navigator, Tundra, Hydroswift motorboat or Metalcraft trailer to
Mr. Cazares.
Ultimately, Mr. Smith could not sell what he did not own. Mr. Cazares' acts
and omissions did not proximately cause the damage that Mr. Smith ascribes to
Mr. Cazares' alleged default on the unenforceable, void June 9,2003 Agreements.
Mr. Cazares paid Mr. Smith a fair rental value for the Navigator, Tundra,
Hydroswift motorboat and Metalcraft trailer while Mr. Cazares had those items in
his possession. As a result, Mr. Cazares owes Mr. Smith no damages, attorney's
fees or costs. Thus, Judge Schofield erred in ruling that Mr. Smith's failure to
comply with these statutory provisions does not convey a private right of action to
Mr. Cazares. R. 265; Addendum A.
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B. WHERE MR. SMITH FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ODOMETER DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 41-1A-902, MR. SMITH FAILED TO CONVEY HIS
INTEREST IN THE VEHICLES TO MR. CAZARES.
Mr. Smith failed to provide any odometer disclosure statement to Mr.
Cazares as required by the Utah Motor Vehicle Act governing odometer statement
disclosure. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-902. (1992). The Utah Motor Vehicle Act
requires that at the time of transfer, a seller shall furnish a buyer with a written
odometer disclosure statement in a form prescribed by the Division of Motor
Vehicles. Id. at 902(2). The statement requires several elements including; the
seller's signature to stipulate to the truthfulness of the odometer reading, the date
of transfer of the vehicle, both the buyer's and the seller's name and address, the
identity (make, model, year, body type, identification number) of the vehicle, the
exact odometer reading at the time of transfer and a warning to the buyer if a
discrepancy exists regarding the odometer. Id.
Mr. Smith never provided Mr. Cazares with odometer disclosure statements
as required by the statute. As a result, Mr. Smith failed to convey his interest in
the vehicles to Mr. Cazares. For this reason, combined with Mr. Smith's failure to
list Mr. Cazares on the title of the vehicles, the decision of the trial court to award
Mr. Smith recovery against Mr. Cazares should be reversed.
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II.

EVEN IF MR. SMITH HAS CONVEYED HIS INTEREST IN THE
VEHICLES DESPITE HIS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
STATUTE, THE "EVENT OF DEFAULT" PROVISION IN THE
CONTRACT IS ILLUSORY AND UNENFORCEABLE.
The provision contained in Paragraph Three of the Navigator and Tundra

Agreements contemplating the return of both vehicles to Smith under all
circumstances in any event of default or breach by Cazares is illusory and
unenforceable. Furthermore, the section of Paragraph Three contemplating the
return of both vehicles to Smith under all circumstances in any event or default or
breach by Mr. Cazares des not reflect any accord between the parties as to a
reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that Mr. Cazares5 breach or
default would cause. Accordingly, Paragraph Three of the Agreements is a penalty
clause, does not describe liquidated damages, and is therefore unenforceable.
Gelzos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1995).
Mr. Smith never communicated with or otherwise notified Mr. Cazares of
any repossession, auction or foreclosure proceedings concerning the Navigator,
Tundra, Hydrowsift motorboat or Metalcraft trailer. Mr. Smith's failure to do so
also constitutes his failure to mitigate the damages Mr. Smith attributes to Mr.
Cazares' alleged default. Mr. Smith's failure to communicate or otherwise
appraise Mr. Cazares of any repossession, auction or foreclosure proceedings
concerning the Navigator, Tundra, Hydroswift motorboat or Metalcraft trailer

18

*

deprived Mr. Cazares of the opportunity to mitigate his own exposure or otherwise
address any issue concerning those items.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Cazares requests this Court to reverse the decision of the lower court
and remand this matter for a new trial where the Court is instructed to use the Utah
Motor Vehicle Act governing Endorsement of Assignment and Warranty of CoOwners and Odometer Statement Disclosure to decide this case.
Dated this 30th Day of November, 2006.

EDWARD W. MrfBRIDE, JR.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Edward W. McBride, Jr. (8236)
BENNETT & McBRIDE, PLLC
10 West Broadway, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411
Telephone: (801) 531-1030
Facsimile: (801) 531-1224
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KIRBY SMITH,
Certificate of Serivce
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
MARK CAZARES,
Defendant/Appellant.
Case No.: 20060384-CA
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of November, 2006, I caused to be
served via first class U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following:
Evan Schmutz
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604

DATED this ^ " day of November, 2006.
BENNETT & McBRIDE, PLLC

Certificate of Mailing

I hereby certify that on the 30 day of November, 2006, I caused to be
served via first class U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Certificate of Service to the following:
Evan Schmutz
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
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EVAN A. SCHMUTZ (3860)
M. REED ADAMS (4783)
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KIRBY SMITH, an individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGMENT
Case No. 030404279

MARK CAZARES, an individual,
Defendant.

Judge: Schofield

This matter was tried to the Court on October 25, 2005, the Honorable Anthony W.
Schofield presiding. At the conclusion of trial, the Court issued a Bench Ruling in favor of
Plaintiff on the question of liability, but left certain issues as to remedies under the Uniform
Commercial Code for further determination. On November 22, 2005, the Court issued a
written Ruling concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to the remedies available under §70A-2709 for an action for the price, and for incidental damages under §70A-2-710. On
_, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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Accordingly, the Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment shall be
entered as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Kirby Smith is hereby awarded judgment against Defendant Mark

Cazares for breach of contract as follows:
a.

For breach on the Toyota Agreement in the amount of $7,621.88,

including interest at the compounded rate of 5.9% per annum, through the date of judgment.
b.

For breach on the Lincoln Agreement in the amount of $7,801.80,

including interest at the compounded rate of 11.49% per annum, through the date of
judgment.
c.

For breach on the Hydroswift Agreement in the amount of $29,770.08,

including interest at the compounded rate of 8.75% per annum, through the date of judgment.
d.

For incidental damages $6,507.22, including prejudgment interest at

the rate of 10% per annum, through the date of judgment.
2.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded his reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of

$13,405.50, and taxable costs in the amount of $787.45.
3.

Plaintiff is therefore entitled to and is hereby awarded judgment against

Defendant in the total amount of:
Damages
Attorneys Fees
Taxable Costs

$51,700.98
$13,405.50
$787.45

Total Judgment

$65,893.93

4.

Interest shall continue to accrue on the total judgment from the date of

judgment at the blended rate of 9.23 % per annum.
5.

Plaintiff is entitled to augment this judgment in the amount of any reasonable

attorney's fees and/or taxable costs incurred in the collection hereof. The amount of any
augmented judgment shall be established by affidavit.

DATED this #9~day of

Wl/lICK , 2006.
BY THE COURT:

/ s / Anthony W. Schofield
Honorable Anthony W. Schofield
Fourth District Judge

Approved as to form and content:

Edward T. McBride
Attorney for Defendant
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I hereby certify that I personally mailed a copy of the foregomg on t h i s ^ _ _ clay of
March, 2006, by first-class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Edward W. McBride, Jr.
Otto & McBride, P.C.
57 West 200 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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